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Isolated reports have long suggested a similarity in content and thought processes across
mind wandering (MW) during waking, and dream mentation during sleep. This overlap
has encouraged speculation that both “daydreaming” and dreaming may engage similar
brain mechanisms. To explore this possibility, we systematically examined published
first-person experiential reports of MW and dreaming and found many similarities: in
both states, content is largely audiovisual and emotional, follows loose narratives tinged
with fantasy, is strongly related to current concerns, draws on long-term memory,
and simulates social interactions. Both states are also characterized by a relative lack
of meta-awareness. To relate first-person reports to neural evidence, we compared
meta-analytic data from numerous functional neuroimaging (PET, fMRI) studies of the
default mode network (DMN, with high chances of MW) and rapid eye movement (REM)
sleep (with high chances of dreaming). Our findings show large overlaps in activation
patterns of cortical regions: similar to MW/DMN activity, dreaming and REM sleep activate
regions implicated in self-referential thought and memory, including medial prefrontal
cortex (PFC), medial temporal lobe structures, and posterior cingulate. Conversely, in
REM sleep numerous PFC executive regions are deactivated, even beyond levels seen
during waking MW. We argue that dreaming can be understood as an “intensified”
version of waking MW: though the two share many similarities, dreams tend to be
longer, more visual and immersive, and to more strongly recruit numerous key hubs of
the DMN. Further, whereas MW recruits fewer PFC regions than goal-directed thought,
dreaming appears to be characterized by an even deeper quiescence of PFC regions
involved in cognitive control and metacognition, with a corresponding lack of insight
and meta-awareness. We suggest, then, that dreaming amplifies the same features that
distinguish MW from goal-directed waking thought.
Keywords: dreaming, mind wandering, default mode network, first-person report, spontaneous thought,
neurophenomenology, memory consolidation, introspection
“The implication is that fantasy and dreams are part of a single con-
tinuing fantasy process which is subject to certain transformations
imposed by physiological and stimulus events. It is unnecessary to
sleep in order to generate dream-like ideation, and, apparently, it
is unnecessary to be awake in order to produce relatively coherent,
undream-like ideation”
–Eric Klinger (1971, p. 57).
INTRODUCTION
Dreaming and daydreaming (or “mind wandering”) seem to have
had an enormous influence on human civilization through the
ages: they are alleged to have inspired René Descartes’s revolu-
tionary view of the mathematical unity of nature (Baillet, 1691;
Browne, 1977) and major scientific breakthroughs including
discovery of the Benzene ring by Kekulé (Benfey, 1958),
formulation of the periodic table byMendeleev (Strathern, 2000),
and Nobel prize-winning research on the chemical basis of neu-
rotransmission by Loewi (1960)—to cite only a few examples.
Psychological research into the subjective content of these states
has revealed an intriguing, if less sensational, picture of dreaming
and mind wandering (MW) as complex integrations of senso-
rimotor imagery, emotions, memories, and future planning, in
which problem-solving can also occur (Domhoff, 2003). Yet these
simultaneously mundane and exceptional mental states remain
difficult to understand and study, in part because they are sub-
jective and “spontaneous” in nature: undirected, unpredictable,
and poorly characterized from both the personal and scientific
perspectives.
Even after decades of scientific research, both behavioral and
neurophysiological (reviewed in Hobson et al., 2000; Smallwood
and Schooler, 2006; Klinger, 2008; Kussé et al., 2010; Schredl,
2010; Christoff et al., 2011; Gruberger et al., 2011; Zadra and
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Domhoff, 2011; Christoff, 2012), the sheer diversity of findings
and perspectives on dreaming and MW can be overwhelming.
MW has been characterized as an unwelcome detriment to pro-
fessional (Smallwood et al., 2011) and educational (Smallwood
et al., 2007) performance, as well as personal affect (Killingsworth
and Gilbert, 2010), but has also been suggested to have an
adaptive role in goal-directed planning (Christoff et al., 2009;
Baird et al., 2011; Andrews-Hanna, 2012), deliberation on cur-
rent concerns (Klinger, 1971, 2008), and creative insight (Baird
et al., 2012). Views on dreaming similarly span a broad spec-
trum: dreammentation is considered by various researchers to be
equivalent to brain delirium (Hobson, 1997) and schizophrenic
psychosis (Solms and Turnbull, 2002), or to be entirely epiphe-
nomenal (Flanagan, 1995). Others, however, have seen in dream-
ing a wellspring of individual growth and inspiration (Bulkeley,
2010), a source of creativity, insight and problem-solving (Schredl
and Erlacher, 2007), an opportunity for emotional adapta-
tion (Cartwright et al., 1998; Lara-Carrasco et al., 2009), and
an expression and potential means of memory consolidation
(Nielsen and Stenstrom, 2005; Wamsley and Stickgold, 2011).
Whereas specific beneficial (or conversely, disruptive) roles
remain largely speculative, however, similarities between both the
subjective and neurophysiological aspects of MW and dreaming
have recently been explored in some detail (Pace-Schott, 2007,
2011; Christoff et al., 2011; Domhoff, 2011). In order to fur-
ther address this question, we outline the general understanding
of what dreaming and MW are, then discuss similarities in the
subjective experience and neural basis of both states. Finally, we
conduct and compare meta-analyses of positron emission tomog-
raphy (PET) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
studies of dreaming (rapid eye movement or “REM” sleep) and
MW (DMN activity) in order to examine potentially overlapping
neural substrates.
WHAT ARE DREAMING AND MINDWANDERING?
“Dreaming” is usually understood as subjective mental experi-
ences during sleep. Although most famously (and strongly) asso-
ciated with REM sleep (Aserinsky and Kleitman, 1953; Dement
and Kleitman, 1957), dream-like thought is also reported during
other sleep stages (see Methods).
For several reasons, by “dreaming” we will generally be refer-
ring to subjective reports drawn from REM sleep: for one thing,
the majority of “dream” reports have been elicited from REM
sleep-stage laboratory awakenings; further, only REM sleep shows
a particularly strong correlation with dream mentation (∼80%
of awakenings from REM sleep result in dream reports: Hobson
et al., 2000). For the purposes of the present paper, then, “dream-
ing” refers to mentation reports from REM sleep.
“Undirected” thought is a similarly complex construct, and
can be divided into several different categories (Christoff, 2012).
“Mind wandering” (MW) and “stimulus-independent thought”
(SIT), for instance, are typically defined as thinking that devi-
ates from a particular task a subject is meant to be completing
(McGuire et al., 1996; Mason et al., 2007; Christoff et al., 2009).
“Spontaneous thought,” on the other hand, is characterized rather
by its undirected, effortless nature—more akin to the everyday
concept of “daydreaming” (Singer, 1966; Klinger, 1990; Christoff,
2012); no particular task, or deviation from it, is required. Subtle
differences are apparent: MW, for example, might be initiated
deliberately (as when a subject decides to “tune out” during a
boring task) rather than being “spontaneous.” Nonetheless, these
terms are often used interchangeably or with only minimal def-
inition. Fluidity of terminology seems inevitable, however, in a
relatively young field of inquiry (Christoff, 2012); moreover, the
subjective content and neural basis of these states appear highly
similar (compare, e.g., Singer and McCraven, 1961; Christoff
et al., 2004, 2009; Stawarczyk et al., 2011). We therefore use these
terms relatively interchangeably throughout this paper. MW,
spontaneous thought, or daydreaming, then, all refer to subjec-
tive reports of undirected thoughts during wakefulness (whether
deviating from, or in the complete absence of, a task).
THE DEFAULT MODE NETWORK (DMN) AND REM SLEEP
Though specific neural correlates of both daydreaming and
dreaming remain somewhat elusive, these mental states, and
their associated subjective content, are strongly correlated with
the “resting state” and REM sleep, respectively (Aserinsky and
Kleitman, 1953; Dement and Kleitman, 1957; Maquet et al., 1996;
Mason et al., 2007; Christoff et al., 2009; Andrews-Hanna et al.,
2010; Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2010; Christoff, 2012; Hasenkamp
et al., 2012).
The default mode network (DMN) was discovered some-
what serendipitously as a pattern of brain deactivations associated
with the difference between brain activity during a quiet, rest-
ing state (the typical baseline condition for early fMRI studies)
and a goal-oriented, directed task (Raichle et al., 2001). Particular
regions were consistently more active during “rest” than during
goal-directed tasks of many kinds, suggesting a “default mode”
network of regions active when a subject was “doing nothing”
(Raichle et al., 2001; see Table 3 and Figure 2 for core regions of
the DMN). It quickly became clear, however, that physical “rest”
by no means implied mental inactivity. With no explicit task,
subjects almost immediately engaged in spontaneous thought,
including daydreaming, planning for the future, recalling mem-
ories, and so on (Gusnard et al., 2001). Subsequent research
has tied the subjective experience of MW to core DMN regions
(Christoff et al., 2004, 2009; Mason et al., 2007; Andrews-Hanna
et al., 2010; Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2010; Hasenkamp et al., 2012).
Although regions beyond the DMN appear to also be recruited
during MW (e.g., Christoff et al., 2009), the DMN still remains
the most commonly used neural proxy for spontaneous thought
(see also Methods).
REM sleep is initiated by a network of cells in the pons and
nearby portions of the midbrain (Siegel, 2011), but involves a
widespread recruitment of higher cortical brain regions (see our
meta-analytic results, below, for regions of this theoretical REM
network: Table 2 and Figure 1). REM sleep recurs, in increas-
ingly lengthy periods, approximately every 90mins throughout
the sleep cycle, overall constituting about 1.5–2 h of an aver-
age night of sleep. Whereas non-REM (NREM) sleep stages are
generally characterized by deactivation of many regions as com-
pared to wakefulness (e.g., Kaufmann et al., 2006), REM is unique
in that many brain regions are clearly more active than dur-
ing wakefulness (Table 2, Figure 1). REM also appears to be the
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most active state from the subjective point of view, with longer,
more emotional, and more frequent dream mentation in REM
than any other sleep stage (Hobson et al., 2000). REM therefore
appears to be by far the best neural marker of dreaming, though
it nonetheless remains problematic (see Methods).
SUBJECTIVE AND NEURAL SIMILARITIES BETWEEN DREAMING AND
MINDWANDERING
A number of similarities in the subjective experience of dreaming
and MW have previously been noted (see Section First-person
Reports of Content from Mind Wandering and Dreaming for a
detailed overview). The possibility that the neural substrate of
the DMN might be involved in, overlap with that of dream-
ing/REM sleep has also been raised (Fosse and Domhoff, 2007;
Pace-Schott, 2007, 2011; Ioannides et al., 2009; Nir and Tononi,
2010), but these comparisons too have remained qualitative: a
quantitative meta-analysis has yet to be applied to the question of
the similarity in neural substrates between DMN/MW and REM
sleep/dreaming. While major reviews and meta-analyses of the
DMN have allowed for a tentative consensus regarding its neu-
ral basis (e.g., Buckner et al., 2008), a meta-analytic evaluation of
brain activity during REM sleep has yet to be undertaken, mak-
ing a direct comparison between brain activity in the two states
difficult. The execution of such a meta-analysis of REM sleep was
therefore a major goal of the present review.
AIMS OF THE PRESENT REVIEW ANDMETA-ANALYSIS
Here we aim to build on prior qualitative comparisons of both
the experiential and brain basis of dreaming and spontaneous
thought with a more definitive, quantitative assessment of the
similarity in brain activity. A strong reliance on first-person
reports of subjective experience has guided much research on
both MW and dreaming, and led to breakthroughs in the under-
standing of their respective neural correlates. Accordingly, we
present a detailed discussion of first-person content reports from
both states in Section First-person Reports of Content fromMind
Wandering and Dreaming. We outline our methods of meta-
analysis of functional neuroimaging data in Section Methods.
In Section Neuroimaging of Mind Wandering and Dreaming:
Meta-analytic Results, we meta-analyze results from functional
neuroimaging (PET) studies of REM sleep (see Methods). We
compare these results to an authoritative meta-analysis of DMN
regions (Buckner et al., 2008) to determine to what extent the
neural substrate of REM sleep overlaps with that of the DMN.
Finally, we present a discussion of findings, limitations, and future
directions, and propose a preliminary model of dreaming as
“intensified” mind wandering.
FIRST-PERSON REPORTS OF CONTENT FROMMIND
WANDERING AND DREAMING
Similarities in subjective content have been noted since the begin-
ning of such research. For instance, the dreamlike nature of
relaxed waking thought was documented in two early studies
of what is now called MW, which were carried out in a sleep
laboratory using EEG to monitor wakefulness. In both studies,
participants were randomly asked to report anything that was
going through their minds at the time of the probe. In the first
study, Foulkes and Scott (1973) found that 24% of thoughts could
be categorized as visual, dramatic, and dreamlike. In a replication
study, Foulkes and Fleisher (1975) discovered that 19% of reports
were dreamlike.
The qualitative characteristics of dreaming have been inten-
sively studied over the past century, yielding a considerable body
of research from which some firm conclusions can be drawn
regarding subjective content. Though qualitative data on the con-
tent of MW is not nearly as comprehensive, a tentative overview is
nonetheless possible. Although a comprehensive review of the lit-
erature is beyond the scope of this article, we highlight consistent
findings regarding the subjective content of dreaming and MW.
We focus on similarities in subject matter across several key areas,
including sensory, emotional, fanciful, mnemonic, motivational,
and social aspects, as well as addressing the presence or absence
of cognitive control and metacognition. Various disparities and
inconsistencies are addressed here, as well as in the Discussion.
SENSORY ASPECTS
The broadest similarity between dreaming and MW is perhaps
also the most basic: the sensory building blocks of spontaneous
thought in both waking and dreaming are overwhelmingly visual
and auditory (though experiences in other sensory modalities are
by no means precluded).
Dreaming
The largely audiovisual nature of dreaming was noted over
two millennia ago by Artemidorus in his Oneirocritica (Harris-
McCoy, 2012) and has been often replicated in contemporary
research. For instance, a recent review of dream content (Schredl,
2010), based on more than 4000 dream reports from both lab-
oratory awakenings and home dream diaries, found that visual
content was present in 100%, and auditory content in ∼57%,
of all reports (Table 1). Other sense modalities (tactile, olfactory,
gustatory, and nociceptive experiences), by contrast, were present
in ∼1% or less of all reports. Indeed, the next most prominent
modality after vision and audition was the vestibular sense: ∼8%
of reports contained experiences of flying, floating, acceleration,
etc. (Schredl, 2010). Intriguingly, a comparison with studies of
dream reports frommore than a century ago shows a very similar
trend: in the late nineteenth century, dream reports also almost
always featured visual elements, followed by auditory imagery as
the next most dominant aspect, and with the remaining senses
Table 1 | Sensory perception in dreaming.








Based on Schredl (2010).
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accounting for very small percentages (∼1–7%) (Schwartz, 2000).
This suggests that the sensory aspects of dreaming may be consis-
tent cross-culturally (or at least, cross-temporally).
The apparent predominance of audio-visual content in dreams
may underestimate other sensory modalities, however. A num-
ber of studies sampling other sensory data revealed that, when
prompted specifically for sensations such as pain (Nielsen et al.,
1993; Raymond et al., 2002; Solomonova et al., 2008) or bod-
ily orienting movements (Solomonova et al., 2008), participants
often reported more information. To our knowledge, similar
targeted sensory-content probes have not yet been undertaken
during MW, precluding a more detailed comparison.
Mind wandering
Content findings from mind wandering are not usually directly
comparable, since MW researchers have tended to focus on the
intensity (rather than the prevalence) of audiovisual imagery,
but available evidence suggests similar trends. For example, fac-
tor analysis of nearly 1500 experience reports found that visual
and auditory intensity are two of eight dimensions significantly
characterizing spontaneous thoughts (Klinger and Cox, 1987).
A more recent study similarly found a very high prevalence of
self-reported visual and auditory imagery during spontaneous
thoughts (mean ratings of 4.22 and 4.02, respectively, on a 7-
point Likert scale) (Stawarczyk et al., 2011). Along these lines, a
recent review concluded that the average spontaneous thought is
moderately visual, contains at least some sound, and is very likely
(74% of reports) to contain some form of interior monolog or
“self-talk” (Klinger, 2008).
POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE EMOTIONALITY
Dreaming
It appears that most dreams (∼70–75% or more in adults) con-
tain some emotion, though affect in dreams may not always be
particularly strong, or appropriate to the context (see Domhoff,
2011, for a discussion). A number of studies have found a rela-
tive predominance of negative emotions in dreams, particularly
when dreams are scored by judges rather than by dreamers (see
Schredl, 2010, for a review). Other studies, however, have found a
balance of emotions in REM sleep dream reports, and one study
(Fosse et al., 2001) found that joy/elation was in fact the most fre-
quently reported emotion. An interesting study directly compared
self-reports of dreaming vs. waking events, finding that negative
emotion (particularly fear) was more prevalent during dreaming,
and positive emotions more common in waking (Nielsen et al.,
1991).
It may be, however, that more intense and negatively
toned dreams are better remembered, and thus over-reported.
Additionally, sampling techniques (e.g., laboratory awakenings
vs. home dream journals) may contribute to differences in
findings. Irrespective of these differences and methodological
limitations, however, it is evident that both positive and negative
emotions are ubiquitous during dreaming.
Mind-wandering
Though not yet extensively studied, emotion appears to be sim-
ilarly ubiquitous during MW. One recent study, for instance,
involving thousands of reports, found that the majority (69%)
of spontaneous thought reports involved emotion (positive emo-
tion in 42.5% of reports, negative emotion in 26.5%), whereas
only 31% of reports were reported to be emotionally neutral
(Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010). Though data are generally
lacking, it is interesting to note that, in contrast to dream-
ing, positive emotion appears to predominate during waking
MW, and that many more waking spontaneous thoughts appear
to be characterized by relatively flat (neutral) affect. Also of
interest is that the temporal focus of MW content appears
to be more directed toward the past when negative mood
has been experimentally induced (Smallwood and O’Connor,
2011).
IMPLAUSIBILITY AND BIZARRENESS
Though the typical spontaneous thought or dream is a rel-
atively plausible simulation or elucidation of past memories,
current events, or future plans, generally in line with the cur-
rent concerns of the subject (see “Motivational Aspects,” below),
nonetheless implausible and bizarre elements are common to
both states—though their precise frequency remains disputed
(Snyder, 1970; Dorus et al., 1971; Zadra and Domhoff, 2011).
Examples are physically impossible or socially unlikely situa-
tions, fanciful locales and characters, large discontinuities of time
and/or space, and so on.
Dreaming
Depending on scoring criteria, it has been estimated that between
32% (Schredl, 2010) and 71% (Stenstrom, 2006) of dream reports
feature bizarre or impossible elements. Despite widely varying
estimates, however, there is general agreement that bizarre, incon-
gruous or impossible elements are features of at least a substantial
proportion of dreams. Differences in precise estimates are likely
due to differing scoring procedures, as well as differences between
dreamer- or judge-rated scores.
Mind-wandering
Though many MW episodes contain relatively realistic simula-
tions of plausible events in the external world, nonetheless a
substantial number (∼20% of reports) contain elements that
are bizarre, implausible, or fanciful (defined as “departing sub-
stantially from physical or social reality”) (Klinger and Cox,
1987; Kroll-Mensing, 1992; Klinger, 2008). A more recent study
has provided a general replication of earlier results: analyzing
thousands of thoughts reported by 124 subjects, Kane et al.
(2007) found that the average thought during MW contained
a moderate level of fantasy (a mean of 3.77 on a 7-point
scale).
In a rare study examining both waking fantasy and dream
reports in the same 12 subjects, Williams et al. (1992) found
that bizarre elements were about twice as prevalent in dreams
vs. waking spontaneous thought. In a similar vein, dream and
daydream bizarreness have been studied in relation to “thick” vs.
“thin” boundaries (Kunzendorf et al., 1997): though thin bound-
ary personality was associated with more bizarre dreams and
daydreams than thick boundary, dreams were scoredmore bizarre
than daydreams across both personality types.
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MNEMONIC FEATURES: CONTRIBUTIONS OF EPISODIC AND
SEMANTIC MEMORY
Both dreaming and MW draw on episodic and semantic mem-
ory sources as building blocks for novel subjective experiences. In
this section we discuss the prevalence of past-oriented thoughts
during both wakefulness and dreaming, and the potential contri-
butions of both episodic and semantic memory to these states.
Dreaming
There is an intriguing literature suggesting that sleep, especially
NREM sleep, may have a role in memory consolidation (Walker
and Stickgold, 2006; Born andWilhelm, 2012), including specific
roles for REM sleep in consolidation of procedural (Smith et al.,
2004) and emotional episodic (Nishida et al., 2009; Groch et al.,
2013) memories. A dynamic model of sleep-dependent memory
consolidation and reconsolidation has recently been proposed,
suggesting a complex relationship between sleep stages, memory
types and their contribution to cognitive stability, flexibility and
brain plasticity (Walker and Stickgold, 2006, 2010).
It is now well documented that dream content borrows from
both temporally proximal and distal memories (Nielsen and
Stenstrom, 2005). The most proximal memories (those from
the previous day) are generally known as “day residue” (Freud,
1908), whereas the recurrence of elements 5–7 days following
an experience is referred to as the “dream-lag” effect (Nielsen
and Powell, 1989). Personally relevant and emotionally salient
events appear to manifest themselves in dream content as day
residue and dream lag effects, but can also surface many years
after initial encoding (Grenier et al., 2005). The presence of emo-
tional and personally relevant content in dreams may be related
to the fact that emotional and impactful events are preferentially
consolidated in memory (McGaugh et al., 2002; Nishida et al.,
2009). While dreaming contains clear episodic autobiographical
elements, memories only rarely get “replayed” in dream content
(∼1–2% of reports: Fosse et al., 2003).
Mind-wandering
MW appears to involve roughly equal percentages of thoughts
about the past and future (Fransson, 2006), though some stud-
ies suggest a “prospective bias” toward future-oriented thoughts
(Smallwood et al., 2009; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010; Stawarczyk
et al., 2011), and also a past-bias inducible by negative mood
(Smallwood and O’Connor, 2011). Overall, however, it is clear
that memories, particularly episodic ones, play a large role in
spontaneous thought. Many studies have reported a high preva-
lence (∼20% or more of reports) of past-focused MW (Fransson,
2006; Smallwood et al., 2009; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010;
Smallwood et al., 2011). Indeed, one of the first studies to explore
“resting state” activity using PET noted the similarities between
such activity and episodic memory recall, as well as the fact that
subjective reports of “rest” actually involved a large amount of
past recollection and future planning (Andreasen et al., 1995).
Similar to dreaming, memories incorporated in waking MW tend
to be of emotional and personally relevant material, and are
often related to people’s current concerns (see section below on
“Motivational Aspects”).
In summary, dreaming and MW both contain specific trace-
able episodic and semantic memory sources, but very rarely
reproduce memories in their entirety. Rather, memories tend
to reappear in novel, re-contextualized thoughts and scenarios
(Nielsen and Stenstrom, 2005).
MOTIVATIONAL ASPECTS: CURRENT CONCERNS
Reports from both dreaming and MW show a strong proclivity
to reflect the ongoing concerns of subjects, as well as elements of
anticipating and planning for the future.
Dreaming
A wealth of data supports the notion that dreaming reflects ongo-
ing waking concerns, desires, and experiences, in line with the
“continuity hypothesis” of dreaming and waking mental activity
(see, e.g., Domhoff, 1996, Ch. 8). For example, transient stress-
ful situations, such as divorce (Cartwright et al., 1984) and grief
(Kuiken et al., 2008) are also often present in dream reports in a
general form.
Although dream content is often found to be thematically and
emotionally consistent with the waking state of the dreamer, cer-
tain activities prevalent in waking are only rarely found in dreams.
These include cognitive activities such as reading, writing, and
using a phone or a computer (Schredl, 2000).
Mind-wandering
Similar to dreaming, the content of wakingMWalso centers heav-
ily on subjects’ current concerns (Klinger and Cox, 1987; Klinger,
2008; Andrews-Hanna, 2012).
Further, when the temporal focus of MW is examined, a large
percentage (∼40% in one recent study: Andrews-Hanna et al.,
2010) of spontaneous thoughts center around the present time
±1 day, supporting the notion that MW strongly involves current
concerns and experiences. Future-oriented thought is also incred-
ibly common during MW (Smallwood et al., 2009; Andrews-
Hanna et al., 2010; Stawarczyk et al., 2011), further supporting a
role for MW in future-planning and potentially problem-solving.
Intriguingly, in one of the few neuroimaging studies to directly
examine periods of MW, MW was associated with activations
not only in the DMN but also in key executive prefrontal areas,
including the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex (Christoff et al., 2009). Such results are con-
sistent with the prevalence of current concerns and unresolved
issues in first-person content reports, and may reflect an ongoing




Similar to waking life, dreaming is nearly always organized
around interactions with others. Most dreams include other
characters in some kind of relationship with the dreamer, or
a generalized social situation (Hall and Van de Castle, 1966;
Nielsen et al., 2003; Schredl et al., 2004; Zadra and Domhoff,
2011). Social interactions in dreams follow a multitude of
patterns, including threatening (Valli et al., 2005) and other-
wise emotionally-charged situations (Cartwright et al., 1984).
Occasionally, recognizable dream characters may change appear-
ance or appear as a generalized entity, fused with features of
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other individuals. Also of interest is the prevalence of “mental-
izing” or use of “theory of mind” in dreaming—i.e., thinking
about others’ thoughts, emotions and motivations (even though
the “others” are of course merely imagined) (McNamara et al.,
2007). In general, meaningful interactions with others may be
one of the key factors guiding the progression of the dream
narrative.
Mind wandering
First-person reports of MW often involve imagined social inter-
actions with others, as well as thoughts about the intentions and
beliefs of other people (Klinger, 2008). This has led to the general
notion that “mentalizing” (i.e., thinking about the thoughts and
minds of others) and the consideration of hypothetical social situ-
ations may be key components of spontaneous thought (Buckner
et al., 2008; Andrews-Hanna, 2012). Supporting this idea, numer-
ous studies have found that brain activity underlying “theory of
mind” and mentalizing overlaps significantly with DMN regions
(see Buckner et al., 2008, for a review).
COGNITIVE CONTROL AND METACOGNITION
Dreaming
A singular aspect of dreams is the seemingly total lack of metacog-
nitive awareness in the dream state. One experiences a com-
plex simulation of oft-bizarre experiences, but without the overt
capacity to reflect on the bizarre state of affairs the mind and
body are actually in see, e.g., Rechtschaffen (1978). Intriguingly,
it appears that well-trained, or talented, individuals can develop
metacognitive awareness of the dream state, becoming “lucid” in
the dream and sometimes even directing its course and content
(Dresler et al., 2012). The exceptional nature of “lucid” dream-
ing, however, serves to prove the rule of the general lack of control
and metacognitive awareness in ordinary dreaming, a character-
istic likely attributable to the deactivation of numerous prefrontal
cortical regions during REM sleep (see our results in Table 2 and
Figure 1; also Hobson et al., 2000; Muzur et al., 2002).
Mind wandering
A lack of explicit goals, and an unawareness that one is even
daydreaming or has deviated from the task at hand, are typi-
cal of MW (Schooler et al., 2011). But although MW tends to
be less characterized by intentional thought and self-reflective
awareness, this is not always the case. A recent study from our
group, for instance, found that subjects who were probed at ran-
dom intervals reported being unaware that they had been mind
wandering about half (45%) of the time. One’s impression of
the “controllability” of a segment of MW also varies widely,
from a sense of being able to end it at any time, to being com-
pletely absorbed in and swept along by a daydream (Klinger, 1978,
2008; Klinger and Cox, 1987; Kroll-Mensing, 1992; Klinger and
Table 2 | Core cortical components of the neural network underlying REM sleep.
Region Cluster size (mm3) Talairach coordinates (x, y, z) [BA]
ACTIVATIONS (REM >WAKING REST)
Cortical regions
Medial prefrontal cortex 368 2, 32, 2 [Area 24]
Posterior cingulate cortex/lingual gyrus 656 28, −66, 4 [Areas 19, 30]
Parahippocampal cortex 1088 24, −40, −10 [Areas 36, 37]
416 −16, −26, −18 [Area 35]
Parahippocampal/entorhinal cortex 104 18, −30, −6 [Areas 28, 35]
Posterior parahippocampus/lingual gyrus 496 −18, −50, −8 [Area 19]
352 22, −58, −6 [Areas 19, 36]
Entorhinal cortex/hippocampus 360 22, −18, −14 [Areas 28, 35]
Subcortical regions
Pons/midbrain 688 8, −14, −18
Caudate nucleus 472 −6, 16, 10
DEACTIVATIONS (REM <WAKING REST)
Cortical regions
Mid/posterior cingulate 752 −8, −34, 28 [Area 23]
Rostrolateral prefrontal cortex 456 32, 44, 20 [Area 10]
Inferior frontal gyrus 296 −46, 26, −2 [Areas 47, 45]
Orbitofrontal cortex 256 −32, 38, −10 [Area 11]
224 38, 36, −12 [Area 11]
120 18, 46, −14 [Area 11]
Superior longitudinal fasciculus 176 28, −42, 20
Peak cortical foci of likely activation and deactivation from a meta-analysis of all functional neuroimaging (PET) studies of REM sleep compared to a baseline of
waking rest. Notably, every cortical cluster of activation overlaps (convergences in bold font) with a core component of the DMN, except for one cluster in left lingual
gyrus [Area 19] (compare with Table 3 and Figure 2). Conversely, significant clusters of deactivation overlap with DMN regions in only one case out of seven. The
cluster labeled as in superior longitudinal fasciculus is approximate only. BA, Brodmann area; DMN, default mode network; PET, positron emission tomography;
REM, rapid eye movement.
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FIGURE 1 | Neural substrate of REM sleep vs. waking rest. Significant
meta-analytic clusters contributing to the neural substrate of REM sleep (as
a proxy for dream mentation). Axial slices are displayed in Talairach space,
with 3mm skip. Color bars indicate likelihood that peaks represent actual
peaks of difference at a given voxel. Activations (REM > waking rest) are in
red-yellow, deactivations (REM < waking rest) in blue-green.
Kroll-Mensing, 1995). Collectively, these results suggest that cog-
nitive control andmetacognitive awareness in MW lie somewhere
between the relative lucidity and self-reflectiveness of normal
waking thought and behavior, and the near-total lack of con-
trol and metacognitive nescience characteristic of regular (i.e.,
non-lucid) dreams. See the Discussion for an elaboration of this
theme.
METHODS
STUDY SELECTION FOR NEUROIMAGINGMETA-ANALYSIS
Dreaming
Though the two phenomena have often been seen as synony-
mous since Aserinsky and Kleitman’s discovery of the associ-
ation between the REM sleep and dreaming (Aserinsky and
Kleitman, 1953), dream-like mental activity occurs in all sleep
stages (Nielsen, 2000), including briefly at sleep onset (NREM1)
(Mavromatis, 1987; Hori et al., 1994; Nielsen et al., 2005) as
well as in NREM2 (Antrobus et al., 1995; Fosse et al., 2004),
particularly later in the night (Cavallero et al., 1992). Mentation
from NREM3/4 sleep, also known as SlowWave Sleep (SWS), has
also been reported, albeit more rarely (Cavallero et al., 1992).
In line with the markedly different patterns of brain activity
throughout the sleep cycle (Kaufmann et al., 2006), the length,
bizarreness, and emotionality of dream reports from various
sleep stages appear to differ significantly, though these dispar-
ities remain controversial, with some researchers arguing that
the important issue is level of cortical activation, not sleep stage
(Antrobus et al., 1995; Cicogna et al., 1998; Foulkes, 1999).
There is also strong evidence from neuropsychological lesion
work that the neural mechanisms underlying REM sleep and
dreaming are doubly dissociable (Solms, 1997, 2000, 2011;
Oudiette et al., 2012). Nonetheless, we use neuroimaging stud-
ies of REM sleep only as a neural proxy for the brain basis of
dreaming in the present study, for several reasons: (1) NREM1, far
from being a uniform state, can be subdivided into at least 8 sub-
stages (Hori et al., 1994). Hallucinatory, dream-like mentation
is only strongly associated with particular sub-stages, especially
those with strong EEG theta rhythms (Hori et al., 1994). To our
knowledge, however, no neuroimaging study has yet examined
these brief epochs in isolation. Data collapsed across all phases
of NREM1, then, is an unsuitable neural marker for dream-like
mentation. (2) Of the few functional neuroimaging studies of
sleep, NREM2 sleep is rarely explicitly divided into early and late
stages based on the ultradian changes in its EEG microarchitec-
ture (Roth and Roehrs, 2000). Since only late NREM2 is even
moderately correlated (∼0.40) with dream mentation (Nielsen,
2000), data collapsed across all phases of NREM2 (which is all
that is currently available) is likewise unsuitable. (3) Despite
the apparent dissociability of REM sleep and dreaming, the two
remain extremely highly correlated, with roughly 70–90% of
awakenings from REM sleep yielding dream reports (∼83% on
average: Nielsen, 2000). So while other sleep stages clearly give rise
to dream-like mentation, we contend that REM is “the best and
most frequent trigger” for dreaming (Domhoff, 2005; p. 5) and
is therefore the best objective neural indicator of strong dream
mentation at the present time.
We therefore reviewed all functional neuroimaging (PET or
fMRI) studies of REM sleep to date (14 studies; Table A1). In
order to minimize the confounding effects of various tasks and
baseline conditions, only studies employing a baseline of resting
wakefulness (either pre- or post-sleep) were included. A total of
6 studies were included, and 8 excluded, from the meta-analysis
(detailed in Table A1). Other reasons for exclusion included the
addition of extraneous factors (e.g., auditory stimulation dur-
ing REM sleep), inclusion of clinical populations, failure to
provide information for peak foci of activation, or lack of an
appropriate baseline (e.g., studies comparing REM sleep dur-
ing phasic rapid-eye-movement events with regular tonic REM
sleep).
Mind wandering
Very few papers to date directly examine periods of mind
wandering vs. non-mind wandering (Christoff et al., 2009;
Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2010; Hasenkamp et al., 2012). Though
numerous other studies have addressed mind wandering
indirectly, they tend to assume an a priori link between DMN
activity and MW (e.g., Mason et al., 2007; Andrews-Hanna et al.,
2010). It appears, however, that this assumption is at least some-
what warranted: Christoff et al. (2009) and Hasenkamp et al.
(2012) indeed found stronger activity in major hubs of the DMN
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(as well as in other regions beyond the DMN) during MW, and
Vanhaudenhuyse et al. (2010) similarly found that self-reported
intensity of internally-directed thinking correlated with stronger
activity in pre-definedDMN regions of interest (ROIs) (e.g., ante-
rior and posterior cingulate cortices, as well as parahippocampal
cortices). Direct meta-analysis of regions active in MW was not
executed, however, because only Christoff et al. (2009) have used
normal subjects, whole-brain (WB) analyses, and direct, online
measures of MW. Though Hasenkamp et al. (2012) used direct,
online MWmeasures andWB (vs. ROI) analyses, they exclusively
employed a specialist population (long-term meditation prac-
titioners); Vanhaudenhuyse et al. (2010) also used online MW
measures and normal subjects, but employed a priori ROIs in
their analyses. These considerations render the comparability of
the three studies questionable, and ameta-analysis ofMW-related
brain activations premature. As with REM sleep and dreaming,
then, we utilize DMN activity as an imperfect neural marker for
spontaneous thought/MW/daydreaming.
Identifying core regions of the default mode network
As a meta-analysis of MW brain activations was precluded by
the above considerations, we consulted a recent comprehensive
review of DMN functional neuroanatomy (Buckner et al., 2008)
in order to highlight cortical regions thought to be key hubs of
the DMN (and by extension, spontaneous thought). There are
numerous ways of determining DMN activity: early studies used
blocked time periods of task vs. rest, whereas more recent stud-
ies have generally used event-related study designs or functional
connectivity analysis. Notably, there is high convergence across
these several techniques (see Figure 2). The final summary of key
DMN regions that we employ here (Table 3) involves the combi-
nation and convergence of data from all three methods, and was
gleaned by Buckner et al. (2008) from the review of 18 data sets
employing hundreds of subjects.
Activation likelihood estimation (ALE) meta-analysis
We used a quantitative, random-effects meta-analytic method
known as activation likelihood estimation (ALE) (Turkeltaub
et al., 2002; Laird et al., 2005; Eickhoff et al., 2009, 2012) imple-
mented in the software program GingerALE 2.1 (San Antonio,
TX: UT Health Science Center Research Imaging Institute). The
most recent ALE algorithm tests for above-chance clustering
of peak foci from different experiments included in the meta-
analysis (Eickhoff et al., 2009, 2012) by comparing actual acti-
vation foci locations/clustering with a null distribution created
by distributing the same number of foci randomly throughout
the brain, through several thousand iterations. Included acti-
vation foci were smoothed using a full-width half maximum
(FWHM) Gaussian kernel dependent on the sample size (sub-
jects) of the experiment from which foci were drawn [larger
sample -> smaller smoothing kernel—empirically determined by
(Eickhoff et al., 2009, 2012)]. Resulting statistical maps show clus-
ters where convergence between activation foci is greater than
would be expected by chance (i.e., if foci from each experiment
were distributed independently).
For REM sleep, we meta-analyzed a total of 67 foci drawn
from 6 studies (Table A1), which yielded 17 meta-analytic results
FIGURE 2 | Multiple fMRI methods defining the default mode network.
Key cortical areas contributing to the default mode network, as revealed
by distinct fMRI methods and study designs. Data are based on a
meta-analysis by Buckner et al. (2008) that included 4 blocked design fMRI
studies, 10 event-related fMRI studies, and 4 studies of functional
connectivity. Colors for each panel of images denote the number of studies
finding significant effects at a given voxel (see color bars and numeric labels
at right). Note the similarity in the pattern of regions recruited, regardless
of method (A), and the strong convergence across all methods (B).
Reproduced with permission from Buckner et al. (2008); originally adapted
from Shannon (2006). ER, event-related; HFC, hippocampal functional
connectivity.
(Table 2; 10 activations, 7 deactivations). Statistical maps were
thresholded using a false discovery rate (FDR—Genovese et al.,
2002) of q = 0.05 and a cluster threshold of k = 100mm3. To
display results, we used template brain images from GingerALE
2.1 displayed in the “Mango” software package (San Antonio, TX:
UT Health Science Center Research Imaging Institute). No ALE
meta-analysis ofMWwas undertaken (for reasons given in “Study
Selection,” above).
NEUROIMAGING OF MIND WANDERING AND DREAMING:
META-ANALYTIC RESULTS
ALE META-ANALYSIS OF REM SLEEP
We observed 8 significant cortical clusters of activation (REM
sleep > waking rest) associated with REM sleep, as well as 2
subcortical clusters in the brainstem (pons) and caudate nucleus
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Table 3 | Core cortical components active in the default mode
network.
Region Approximate brain areas (BA)
Ventromedial prefrontal cortex 24, 10 m/10 r/10 p, 32 ac
Dorsal medial prefrontal cortex 24, 32ac, 10p, 9
Posterior cingulate/retrosplenial cortex 29/30, 23/31
Inferior parietal lobule 39, 40
Lateral temporal cortex 21
Hippocampus –
Parahippocampus 35, 36
Entorhinal cortex 28, 34
Key cortical brain structures contributing to human default mode network activ-
ity. Note that most (6 of 8) components of the DMN overlap with regions that
are activated during REM sleep (Table 2), with the exceptions of the inferior pari-
etal lobule and lateral temporal cortex. Adapted from Buckner et al. (2008). BA,
Brodmann area.
(Table 2 and Figure 1). Of the 8 cortical clusters, 7 overlapped
with key regions of the DMN (Table 2: convergences in bold font;
compare with Table 3). We also observed 7 significant cortical
clusters of deactivation (REM sleep < waking rest). Except for
one area of overlap with the DMN in the mid/posterior cingulate
cortex, almost all deactivations were in prefrontal areas.
CORE CORTICAL COMPONENTS OF THE DEFAULT MODE NETWORK
We identified 8 core cortical regions of the default mode network
(Table 3 and Figure 2) based on a recent authoritative review
(Buckner et al., 2008; see also Methods).
DISCUSSION: THE STREAM OF (SPONTANEOUS) THOUGHT
AND ITS FUNCTIONS
“Imagery [i.e., spontaneous thoughts and fantasies] thus needs to be
seen within this context–it is not simply produced under conditions
of demand by tasks of learning or recall, but it almost continuously
emerges into consciousness, probably as a feature of the very nature of
the brain’s function and of man as a plan-making organism”—Singer
and Antrobus (1972, p. 176–177).
The appellation “daydreaming,” often used interchangeably with
“mind wandering,” highlights the folk psychological similarity
between MW and dreaming evident even in our language. Here
we have provided evidence that both quantitative meta-analysis
and qualitative comparisons support this ostensibly facile anal-
ogy. Our results suggest significant similarities in both the sub-
jective content and neurophysiological signatures of these two
apparently distinct states, amplifying observations and theoreti-
cal accounts of our own (Christoff et al., 2011; Domhoff, 2011)
and others (Pace-Schott, 2007, 2011).
The idea that dreaming and MW may lie on a single con-
tinuum has a number of precedents. Freud (1908), for instance,
saw dreams, daydreams and creative endeavors as reflections of
the same underlying processes. More recently, we have explored
the idea that dreaming may share the same associative mech-
anisms and recruit the same neural networks (particularly the
DMN) as daydreaming (Christoff et al., 2011; Domhoff, 2011).
Others have also proposed an uninterrupted mental continuum
between very focused waking thought, waking MW, and fully
immersive dreaming (Hartmann, 1996; see also Windt, 2010).
Below, we expand on this idea of a continuum in our discus-
sion of our qualitative and meta-analytic results. We also address
limitations of the present meta-analysis, potential functions of
spontaneous thought in both waking and dreaming, and future
directions.
META-ANALYSIS OF CORTICAL ACTIVITY DURING REM SLEEP
To our knowledge, the present paper is the first to conduct
a quantitative meta-analysis of functional neuroimaging stud-
ies of REM sleep. Based on data from six studies of essentially
“pure” REM sleep (no extraneous stimuli or tasks, healthy non-
clinical populations, comparison to waking baseline), we found
10 meta-analytic clusters of significant activation (REM > wak-
ing rest). As noted by the authors of the original studies, activated
regions are highly consistent with the subjective aspects of dream-
ing. Clusters were observed in numerous high-level visual areas,
such as the parahippocampal place area, fusiform gyrus, and
lingual gyrus, consistent with the ubiquitous, immersive visual
imagery characteristic of dreams. Regions implicated in long-
term and episodic memory, as well as in imagining future scenes
and situations (Schacter et al., 2007), are also active, including
parahippocampal cortex, hippocampus, and entorhinal cortex.
Finally, multiple clusters were observed in mPFC regions, which,
most relevant to the present results, have been strongly impli-
cated in self-referential thought and affective decisions (Raichle
et al., 2001; Buckner et al., 2008; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010).
We also found several (7) clusters of deactivation, mostly in the
frontal lobe—consistent with prior accounts (e.g., Muzur et al.,
2002).
OVERLAPPING AND NON-OVERLAPPING PATTERNS OF BRAIN
ACTIVITY IN THE DMN AND REM SLEEP
When we compared our meta-analytic results for REM sleep
to core regions of the DMN, we found substantial overlap.
Specifically, of the 8 significant cortical clusters of activation
identified in our ALE meta-analysis of REM sleep, all but one
overlapped to at least some extent with core regions of the DMN.
The most complete overlap is apparent in regions of mPFC
and medial temporal lobe (MTL) structures, including parahip-
pocampal, hippocampal, and entorhinal cortices (Table 2 and
Figure 1). Importantly, other sleep stages show mostly deacti-
vations compared to waking baselines, and generally in regions
outside the DMN (e.g., Kaufmann et al., 2006). This suggests
that the observed overlap with the DMN is not common to all
sleep stages, but specific to REM sleep—the only sleep stage truly
reliably associated with dream mentation.
The overlap is of course far from perfect (compare Table 2 and
Figure 1 with Table 3 and Figure 2). Several regions beyond the
DMN are evident in our results (fusiform gyrus, parahippocam-
pal place area [PPA], and lingual gyrus). Conversely, several
regions of the DMN are represented poorly (posterior cingulate
cortex [PCC]) or not at all (inferior parietal lobule [IPL], lat-
eral temporal cortex [LTC]) in our tentative REM sleep map.
The most easily explained discrepancy is that numerous REM
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clusters extend beyond DMN regions to include cortical regions
well known to be involved in high-level visual processing, such as
the fusiform gyrus, PPA, and lingual gyrus. Such results are con-
sistent with the highly visual nature of dreaming, and with our
hypothesis (see below) that dreaming can be considered an inten-
sified version of spontaneous waking thoughts (which are only
moderately visual in nature—see Section First-person Reports
of Content from Mind Wandering and Dreaming). Another dis-
crepancy is in PCC. REM sleep meta-analysis revealed a large
(656mm3) cluster of activation in the area of the right PCC,
but this cluster extended largely into the lingual gyrus (BA 19),
and was more lateral than typical activations in DMN (e.g.,
Buckner et al., 2008) and during MW (e.g., Christoff et al.,
2009). We also found a large (752mm3) cluster of deactivation
in the area of the mid/posterior cingulate cortex. Further, the
IPL was not observed at all in our meta-analytic REM sleep
results.
Due to their rich reciprocal anatomical connections and
strong functional connectivity with MTL structures, the PCC
and IPL have been hypothesized to be involved in access-
ing episodic/autobiographical memories during spontaneous
thought (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010). These parietal regions
may direct attention to such memories and make them available
to higher cortical (e.g., prefrontal) regions, whereby they reach
conscious awareness. If tenable, this putative role for PCC and
IPL in spontaneous thought may in part explain the observed
discrepancies in brain activation between REM sleep and the
DMN. Though dreaming clearly draws on both long-term and
recent memories (Section First-person Reports of Content from
MindWandering and Dreaming), dream mentation almost never
involves replay of particular episodic memories (Fosse et al.,
2003). Moreover, the general lack of self-knowledge in dreams
and the frequent failure to note abnormalities that an intact
memory might easily notice (such as the appearance of deceased
relatives), are well known phenomena. Finally, dreams are notori-
ously difficult to recall, even with regular practice, and especially
after any significant delay. All the above considerations are con-
sistent with a general disconnect during dreaming between highly
active memory centers in the MTL and relatively quiescent hubs
in the PCC and IPL of the parietal lobe.
Another possibility is that DMN regions we failed to detect in
our meta-analysis (in particular, IPL and LTC) are indeed active
during REM sleep, but are simply no more active than during
waking rest—the baseline condition with which REM sleep was
compared. Because studies of REM sleep have relied on sim-
ple contrasts (REM > waking rest), these regions could be just
as active during REM sleep as during waking rest (and there-
fore, presumably, spontaneous thought). The lack of significantly
greater activity, however, would prevent their detection either in
the original REM sleep studies or in our meta-analysis (though
this would not explain the cluster of deactivation we observed in
mid-PCC). At present, available data cannot address this possi-
bility, but one option for future research would be to carefully
examine functional connectivity between regions active in REM
sleep, to determine whether other areas (possibly IPL and LTC)
are implicated. This strategy has been used to further explore
regions involved in the DMN, and has led, e.g., to the conviction
that, despite earlier ambiguity, medial temporal lobe structures
are indeed a critical component (Buckner et al., 2008).
Aside from comparing overlap between regions key to both
REM sleep and DMN activity, also of interest is the converse
comparison: examining brain regions unrelated to dreaming and
their potential overlap (or lack thereof) with DMN areas. In
an exhaustive study relating brain lesion locus to dreaming in
332 neuropsychological patients, Solms (1997) found that 200
patients reported no changes in dream mentation. In support of
our central hypothesis, lesions among these patients were primar-
ily in sensorimotor cortices and dorsolateral PFC (Solms, 1997),
none of which appear to be key to REM sleep (Table 2) or DMN
functioning (Table 3).
Finally, we observed a number of significant clusters of deac-
tivation (REM < waking rest), nearly all of which were in lateral
PFC regions, including left RLPFC and bilateral orbitofrontal cor-
tex. These regions have been strongly implicated in top-down
regulation of emotion, cognitive control, andmetacognitive mon-
itoring (e.g., Christoff and Gabrieli, 2000), and are among the
key areas that become more active with a variety of effortful, top-
down tasks, as compared to the resting state. This suggests a trend
of decreasing PFC activity from waking thought, through MW, to
dreaming (see below, and Figure 3).
DREAMING AS INTENSIFIED MIND WANDERING: EVIDENCE FROM
FIRST-PERSON REPORTS
In many ways, first-person experiences in both states are simi-
lar: dreams and spontaneous thoughts are both likely (∼20–30%
FIGURE 3 | Tentative model of dreaming as intensified mind
wandering. A preliminary model of dreaming as an intensified version of
waking mind wandering. Intensity of audiovisual imagery, number of bizarre
or implausible elements, and activity in DMN regions all appear to increase
from waking, goal-directed thought, through waking spontaneous thoughts,
to dream mentation. The opposite trend may hold for activity levels in
prefrontal executive regions such as anterior cingulate cortex and
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, which are highly active in goal-directed
waking thoughts and tasks, only somewhat active during mind wandering
(Christoff et al., 2009), and mostly quiescent during dreaming/REM sleep
(Table 2). Solid lines represent subjective, experiential elements; dashed
lines represent brain activity levels as measured by regional cerebral blood
flow using PET, or BOLD (blood-oxygen-level-dependent) signal using fMRI.
DMN, default mode network; PFC, prefrontal cortex.
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of reports) to contain bizarre or implausible elements, to con-
tain positive or negative emotion (∼60–80% of reports), to draw
on proximal and distal memory sources, to relate strongly to
subjects’ current concerns, and to involve simulated social inter-
action. Differences are apparent in other respects, however, and
we argue that each difference suggests a greater preponderance
or “intensity” of a given element in dreaming. First, the sensory
aspects of dreams are far more immersive and intense than dur-
ing waking spontaneous thought. Waking spontaneous thoughts
tend to be tinged with audiovisual aspects, which typically coin-
cide with some level of awareness of the external environment and
sensory inputs. In dreaming, conversely, external sensory inputs
are almost entirely blocked, and the audiovisual content can take
on the aspect of an immersive, three-dimensional simulated real-
ity. Second, the potential for bizarre or impossible content seems
not only more common but more intense in dreams, though the
debate over how to measure “bizarreness” makes strong claims
impossible in this respect. Third, dreams appear to be temporally
extended, fairly cohesive narratives spanning several minutes or
longer, whereas waking MW thoughts typically only last for sev-
eral seconds (Klinger, 1978). Fourth, a recent study examining the
memory sources of dreams found that a substantial amount of
dream content that was traceable to waking experience (∼39% of
memory sources) was in fact “replay” or recall of waking thoughts,
as opposed to perceptions or other experiences (Fosse et al.,
2003), further suggesting that dreaming amplifies and intensi-
fies waking thoughts. Taken together, these findings (as well as
our meta-analytic neuroimaging results—see next section) sup-
port the idea that dreaming can be seen as an intensified version
of waking spontaneous thought—or conversely, that MW dur-
ing wakefulness could be seen as an attenuated, waking form of
dreaming (or, as its colloquial moniker suggests, “daydreaming”)
(see Figure 3).
NEURAL EVIDENCE FOR DREAMING AS INTENSIFIED MIND
WANDERING
To ensure a consistent picture of REM sleep brain activity, we only
included in our meta-analysis studies that used relaxed wakeful-
ness (instead of, e.g., other sleep stages) as a baseline condition.
Thus the activations observed in REM sleep (Table 2) are in con-
trast to quiet, waking rest, which—though not directly examined
in the studies in question—would very likely have resulted in
spontaneous thought/MW at the subjective level, and recruited
DMN brain regions. Since the observed foci of activation gen-
erally represent t-tests contrasting REM sleep > waking rest, it
seems probable that our meta-analytic results actually represent
regions showing greater activity during REM sleep than during
DMN activation/MW. Because so many significant clusters for
REM sleep activation overlapped with DMN regions, these results
suggest that brain activity in REM sleep does not simply par-
allel DMN activity, but rather represents an intensified version
of it (Figure 3). The finding of greater cerebral blood flow in
DMN regions during REM sleep vs. probable waking DMN activ-
ity is consistent with the many qualitative, first-person results
discussed above (Section First-person Reports of Content from
Mind Wandering and Dreaming), which suggest that mentation
during REM sleep is in many ways a longer, immersive, more
intensive version of waking spontaneous thoughts and daydreams
(Figure 3).
Also of interest are prefrontal cortical (PFC) regions, involved
in executive processes like cognitive control and goal-directed
thought. It is well known that numerous such regions, particu-
larly the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and dorsolateral PFC
(DLPFC), are consistently engaged by effortful, goal-directed
tasks (Duncan and Owen, 2000). Though executive PFC regions
are not part of the canonical DMN (Table 3; Buckner et al.,
2008), more direct, online assessments of MW, using first-person
reports combined with fMRI, show that executive PFC areas,
alongside core DMN areas, may also be activated during MW
(Christoff et al., 2009). Though MW-related activity was not
observed in some other PFC regions, robust activation was found
in dorsal ACC and DLPFC (Christoff et al., 2009), suggesting
that executive processes may to some degree be ongoing during
MW. REM sleep, in contrast, shows no such activations; indeed,
we found numerous executive PFC regions to be deactivated
(Table 2, Figure 1). We propose the tentative notion that waking
thought, waking MW, and dream mentation may lie along a con-
tinuum of intensity with respect to executive function, as well:
executive regions are most active during waking goal-directed
thought, undergo a large (but probably not total) diminution
during waking rest/MW, and become relatively quiescent, per-
haps even actively suppressed, during REM sleep (Figure 3; see
also Christoff et al., 2011).
PUTATIVE FUNCTIONS OF SPONTANEOUS THOUGHT DURING
WAKEFULNESS AND SLEEP
Numerous reviews have recently examined potential functions
of spontaneous thought/DMN (Buckner et al., 2008; Klinger,
2008; Christoff et al., 2011; Andrews-Hanna, 2012) and dream-
ing/REM sleep (e.g., Domhoff, 2003; Deseilles et al., 2011, Ch.
6), so we offer only a brief overview of key ideas here. Despite
sparse empirical data overall, discussion of functionality seems
to us necessary because brains, particularly those as large as the
ones possessed by homo sapiens, are very metabolically expen-
sive organs to maintain, consuming an egregiously dispropor-
tionate share of the body’s energy when compared to their
relative mass (roughly 15–20% of the body’s basal metabolic
energy expenditure for a mere ∼2% of its body mass: Aiello
and Wheeler, 1995). The large amount of time spent in REM
sleep (∼1.5–2 h per night) and the prevalence of MW during
wakefulness (∼30–50% of waking thought) collectively suggest
that a non-trivial proportion of this metabolic energy is dedi-
cated to spontaneous thought in one form or another, inviting
the question of what biological-evolutionary function the latter
might serve.
One major theory is that spontaneous thought involves goal-
oriented (if still somewhat “undirected”) processing of current
concerns and planning for the future (Buckner et al., 2008;
Klinger, 2008; Baird et al., 2011; Stawarczyk et al., 2011; Andrews-
Hanna, 2012; Mooneyham and Schooler, 2013). This notion is
consonant with the large amount of subjective content focused
on imagined future scenarios and with the high prevalence of
subjects’ current concerns in content reports of both dreams
and waking MW (Section First-person Reports of Content from
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Mind Wandering and Dreaming). On this view, a major func-
tion of the brain when not strongly occupied by external stimuli
is to address current issues and plan for future events, both
expected and hypothetical. This process would likely involve the
recombination of episodic and semantic memories to yield plau-
sible future scenarios, explaining in part the large proportion
of past-oriented thought evident in both waking and sleeping
spontaneous thought.
A second possibility, complementary to the first, is that of
offline memory consolidation and reconsolidation (Christoff
et al., 2011). Memory traces are known to be reactivated during
REM sleep, both in terms of replay of neural activity sequences
as observed with single-cell recordings in rats (Wilson and
McNaughton, 1994), and reactivation of regions shown to be
active during learning, as revealed by fMRI in human subjects
(Maquet et al., 2000). Intriguingly, very similar results have been
found during periods of wakefulness after training, again at the
single-cell level in rats (Sutherland andMcNaughton, 2000; Foster
and Wilson, 2006) and at the regional level with fMRI in humans
(Peigneux et al., 2006). Collectively, these results suggest that
the subjective experiences of wakeful MW and dream menta-
tion may represent, at least in part, the phenomenal side of an
underlying brain process involving memory consolidation and
reconsolidation (see Christoff et al., 2011, for a more detailed
discussion).
A third idea, oft-reported anecdotally but difficult to demon-
strate experimentally, is that dreams and daydreams serve
to facilitate creativity, insight, and problem-solving, some-
times explained via the mechanism of “incubation” (Schredl
and Erlacher, 2007; Baird et al., 2012). Though intrigu-
ing, support for this idea remains mostly anecdotal (see
Introduction; also Csikszentmihalyi, 1996). Experimental stud-
ies have begun to address this question, however (e.g.,
Baird et al., 2012), and a recent fMRI study from our
group found higher activity in DMN regions (hippocam-
pus, parahippocampus, and inferior parietal lobule—all bilater-
ally) during the generation of creative artwork (Ellamil et al.,
2012).
LIMITATIONS
Several limitations of the present review andmeta-analysis should
be acknowledged. First and most important is the use of DMN
and REM sleep brain activity as neuromarkers for MW and
dreaming, respectively. Though both pairs of states are tightly
coupled, as outlined in detail above, it should be stressed that
they are by no means identical. We therefore anticipate that in
the future, more specific neuroimaging work will directly target
MW and dreaming, as distinct from DMN and REM sleep activ-
ity, respectively, both extending and improving upon the present
preliminary results. This issue is considered in greater detail in the
Methods section above.
Second, though the meta-analytic neural substrate of dream-
ing overlaps considerably with that of the DMN, many activation
clusters extend beyond DMN hubs. These discrepancies may be
due in part to noise attributable to the small sample size of REM
studies (6 reports), but they likely also reflect real brain sub-
strate differences between these two states. In our view, some of
these differences are consonant with the aforementioned “inten-
sity” hypothesis; others, however (e.g., minimal PCC, and total
lack of IPL and LTC activations in REM sleep) may point toward
either genuine differences in neural substrate, or possibly very
similar levels of activity indistinguishable by subtraction contrasts
(REM> waking rest, or waking rest > REM).
Third, despite many experiential and neural similarities,
dreaming is predictably engaged in for long periods each
night (several minutes to over an hour) throughout the
sleep cycle, particularly during REM sleep (Aserinsky and
Kleitman, 1953; Dement and Kleitman, 1957), whereas day-
dreaming tends to be more sporadic and short-lived, and is
most commonly occasioned by low external task demands
(Antrobus et al., 1966), among other factors (Smallwood and
Schooler, 2006). The mechanisms of initiation, and/or impe-
tus for the content reaching conscious awareness, may therefore
be distinct.
Fourth, the neurochemical dynamics of REM sleep differ
markedly from those of normal waking (Solms, 2002). It may
be that the neurochemistry of MW and/or quiet waking rest
differs from that of normal waking, and might even resemble
that of REM sleep—or lie somewhere between the two. To our
knowledge, this remains a largely unexplored question (though
see Christoff et al., 2011, for a discussion), but it seems probable
that the neurochemical basis of waking rest and/orMWwill differ
in important ways from the exceptional neurochemistry of REM
sleep.
Fifth, all the studies in our meta-analysis of REM sleep
employed PET imaging (the incredible noise created by fMRI
scanners make sleep studies difficult), whereas all the studies
included in the meta-analysis of Buckner et al. (2008) to iden-
tify core regions of the DMN (Table 3) employed fMRI. Although
this presents the possibility of systematic confounding differ-
ences, data from both modalities is routinely pooled together in
meta-analyses and reviews. Further, for the DMN at least, studies
have been conducted using both modalities with similar results.
Indeed, the early work (e.g., Andreasen et al., 1995; Raichle et al.,
2001) upon which all subsequent investigation of the DMN has
been based used exclusively PET imaging; much subsequent work
with fMRI, however, has largely confirmed these early PET results
(see Buckner et al., 2008), reinforcing the idea of a certain degree
of comparability across these two modalities.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The relation between brain activity across sleep stages, the
associated subjective content related to each stage, and the
potential involvement of the DMN remain open and intrigu-
ing questions for future research. Interestingly, other sleep stages
(beyond REM) show evidence for dream-like mentation to
varying degrees, with late-night NREM2 and a brief epoch
at sleep onset (NREM1) of particular interest, whereas other
stages (early-night NREM2 and NREM3/4 or SWS) are associ-
ated with little subjective experience. Intriguingly, some studies
have shown decreased DMN functional connectivity across var-
ious NREM sleep stages (Horovitz et al., 2009; Sämann et al.,
2011), consistent with our central hypothesis; others, however,
find more complex relationships among subsets of the DMN
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(Koike et al., 2011). Research also continues apace into functional
connectivity among various other brain regions and networks
(other than the DMN) throughout the sleep cycle (e.g., Horovitz
et al., 2008; Larson-Prior et al., 2009), further complicating the
picture.
One particular case allows for a fairly straightforward pre-
diction, however: late-night/early-morning NREM2 laboratory
awakenings give rise to more, and more dream-like, menta-
tion reports than awakenings from NREM2 cycles early in the
night (Antrobus et al., 1995; Cicogna et al., 1998). Though
REM is the predominant sleep stage later in the night, present-
ing a potential confound, these qualitative results nonetheless
suggest that late- vs. early-night NREM2 sleep may show dis-
tinctive patterns of brain activity, though to our knowledge this
has yet to be examined with functional neuroimaging. Based
on first-person reports and the present meta-analytic results, we
hypothesize that late-night NREM2, if isolable, may show brain
activity similar to the DMN and REM sleep (see also Domhoff,
2011).
Comprehensive testing of the various theoretical accounts of
putative functionality for spontaneous thought and dreaming is
also important. Though at least some spontaneous thoughts seem
of undeniable value to individuals, there appear too to be many
less-than-useful thoughts, and incoherent dreams. Future work
can address this issue by exploring differential neural correlates
and subjective qualities of dreams and spontaneous thoughts
related to any number of factors of interest, such as creativity
and planning for the future (see, e.g., Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010;
Stawarczyk et al., 2011).
Clearly, much work remains to be done in elucidating
the connections between MW, dreaming, REM sleep and
the DMN. In particular, future work should further exam-
ine spontaneous thoughts from both wakefulness and sleep
stages in the same subjects to allow for direct comparisons of
first-person reports. Ideally, such studies could also compare
DMN activity and REM sleep activation in the same subjects,
as well.
Though subjective content reports have long suggested sim-
ilar neural processes underlying dreaming and waking MW,
here we have presented the first strong neuroimaging evi-
dence that this is indeed the case. We hope that subse-
quent behavioral and neuroimaging research, ideally con-
ducted in conjunction with detailed first-person reports, will
increase our knowledge of these still poorly understood men-
tal states, and amplify the present finding of their shared neural
basis.
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APPENDIX
Table A1 | Summary of included and excluded neuroimaging studies of REM sleep.
Study Modality Subjects Included? Reason for exclusion
Hong et al., 1995 PET 9 N Only epochs containing REMs/saccades analyzed
Maquet et al., 1996 PET 11 Y –
Nofzinger et al., 1997 PET 6 Y –
Braun et al., 1997 PET 37 Y –
Braun et al., 1998 PET 10 Y –
Lövblad et al., 1999 fMRI 5 N No peak foci reported
Maquet et al., 2000 PET 5 Y –
Peigneux et al., 2001 PET 12 Y –
Wehrle et al., 2005 fMRI 11 N Within-REM sleep comparisons only
Wehrle et al., 2007 fMRI 11 N Auditory stimulation during sleep
Hong et al., 2009 fMRI 11 N Only epochs containing REMs/saccades analyzed
Miyauchi et al., 2009 fMRI 17 N Within-REM sleep comparisons only
Dresler et al., 2012 fMRI 4 N Within-REM sleep comparisons only
Germain et al., 2013 PET 18 N Clinical population (combat veterans with PTSD)
fMRI, functional magnetic resonance imaging; N, no; PET, positron emission tomography; PTSD, post-traumatic stress disorder; REM, rapid eye movement; Y, yes.
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